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This paper uses data from the 1990s to examine changes in the wages, employment, and
effort of nurses in California hospitals following takeovers by large chains. The market for nurses
has been described as a classic monopsony, so that one might expect increases in firm market power
to be associated with declines in wages. However, we show that if one extends the monopsony
model to consider effort, or if we apply a basic contracting model to the data, then we would expect
to see effects on effort rather than on wages. This prediction is bourne out by the data — nurses see
few declines in wages following takeovers, but see increases in the number of patients per nurse, our
measure of effort. We also find that these changes are similar in the largest for-profit and non-profit
chains, suggesting that market forces are more important than institutional form.
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In a seminal paper, Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) examine the eﬀects of product market
concentration on the wages and employment of women in the banking industry. This paper
examines the labor market eﬀects of consolidation in the hospital industry in California over
the 1990s. This industry has experienced remarkable changes in market structure in a very
short period of time. Over half of all hospitals in California are now part of a multi-hospital
chain, and the six largest chains control over a third of the hospitals (Spetz et al. 1999,
2000). This type of consolidation is apparent all over the country, and California is on its
leading edge. Although a good deal of qualitative evidence exists regarding the eﬀects of
these mergers, no quantitative research on the impact of these takeovers on employment
contracts has been conducted.
The hospital sector is large, accounting for 3% of GDP, and individual hospitals are
often important employers in the markets that they serve. These facts have generated a
literature on monopsony in the market for nurses. The standard monopsony model predicts
that employment will be reduced below the competitive level, with subsequent reductions in
wages. Researchers such as Yett (1975) view hospitals as “classic” examples of monopsonists,
pointing to chronic shortages of nurses as evidence of hospital market power. However, careful
empirical work by Sullivan (1989) and Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) ﬁnd little evidence
that market power reduces wages. Boal and Ransom (1997) conclude in their review of the
monopsony literature that if monopsony in the market for nurses exists, then the extent of
monopsony power is small.
These negative ﬁndings are puzzling in light of the hostility that California nurses have
shown towards hospital takeovers and large chains. However, surveys of nurses indicate that
they associate takeovers primarily with increases in workload rather than with reductions
in wages. We extend the standard monopsony model by considering an employer who sets
minimum eﬀort levels as well as wages and employment. We show that in this model,
increases in market power are associated with increases in eﬀort but have ambiguous eﬀects
on the wage. We ﬁnd that this model is consistent with the data in that the most striking
eﬀect of takeovers is that they increase eﬀort, measured as the number of patients each
employee is responsible for per day. This eﬀect is most noticeable in the two largest chains:
Catholic Healthcare West and Tenet which is notable in view of the fact that the former is
a non-proﬁt chain while the latter is a for-proﬁt chain. Thus, our results lend support to
another claim by nurses that non-proﬁt chains are “... really no diﬀerent in their business
1philosophy [than for-proﬁt ﬁrms], in the way they provide care or the way they treat workers”
(Sal Rosselli, President of Local 250 of the Service Employees International Union, quoted
in Hall, 1996).
We show that the results regarding wages, employment, and eﬀort can also be generated
in a contracting model if wages are "contractible" while eﬀort is not. Under certain assump-
tions the two models can be distinguished by examining eﬀects on revenues: Monopsony
predicts declining revenues (but increasing proﬁts) with takeovers while contracting predicts
increasing revenues.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides some background on hospital
mergers and hospital chains in California. Section 2 describes the data, and section 3 lays
out models which include eﬀort as well as work hours and wages. Our main results are in
section 4, while section 5 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Why do Hospitals Merge?
Several reasons have been given for hospital mergers, and for hospital consolidation more
generally (see Barro and Cutler, 1997 and Sloan, 2002 for summaries of this literature).
First, case studies suggest that hospitals that merge typically experience ﬁnancial diﬃculties
in the years leading up to the merger. Technological improvements in health care have led to
shorter stays for many classes of patients (such as women giving birth), leading to a general
shakeout of excess capacity in the hospital industry.
Second, the rise of managed care organizations such as Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) has transformed the health care market (c.f. Currie and Fahr, 2002a,b). Hospitals
may band together in order to deal with the ﬁnancial pressures created by these organizations.
Or more generally, they may join together to increase market power in the product market
in order to raise prices, or in the labor market in order to reduce costs. Buerhaus and Staiger
(1999) show that after growing through the 1980s, the wages of nurses began to fall in the
1990s, and that declines started sooner in states with high HMO enrollments than in states
with low enrollments. These considerations suggest that it will be important to control for
diﬀerences between hospitals and between hospital markets, when examining the eﬀects of
mergers.
A third possibility is that successful chains bring a more eﬃcient mode of production to
2target hospitals. Conversations with executives of Columbia/HCA suggest that they impose
a centralized set of procedures on all their hospitals and also track key indicators for each
hospital centrally.1 Such measures might increase the eﬃciency of production. Cutler and
Horowitz (2000) oﬀer case study evidence which suggests that for-proﬁt hospital chains are
better able to gain public-sector reimbursements, which again suggests that they may be
better managed than other hospitals.
A closely related idea is that badly managed hospitals are more likely to be takeover
targets. If hospital management would have improved even in the absence of the takeover,
then we may wrongly attribute regression to the mean to the merger. Ashenfelter (1978) ob-
serves that people often enter training programs when they have temporary dips in earnings.
The "Ashenfelter dip" makes data on post-training earnings increases diﬃcult to interpret,
because we would have expected earnings to increase from their temporarily low levels with
or without the training. The main issue in the merger context then, is whether one would
have expected management to improve in the absence of an intervention such as a takeover.
One way around this diﬃculty is to see whether all takeovers have similar eﬀects, as we
would expect to see if takeovers routinely occurred when management was at its worst.
2.2 Evidence Regarding Eﬀects of Hospital Mergers
Several previous studies have examined the eﬀects of mergers on hospital ﬁnancial perfor-
mance, and patient care, with mixed results.2 Barro (2000) examines the ﬁnancial perfor-
mance of Massachusetts hospitals over the period 1985 to 1995. He ﬁnds that although
mergers were associated with reductions in beds and staﬀ, there is little evidence that merg-
ers reduced costs normalized using hospital assets. Conner et al. (1998) study 3500 general
hospitals from 1986 to 1994 and ﬁnd some evidence of reduced costs per discharge after
hospital mergers. Dranove (1998) suggests that scale economies exist only for small hospi-
tals, and that there are no scale eﬃciencies possible for hospitals with 200 or more beds.
Summarizing the mixed evidence on scale economies, Dranove (2000) concludes that cost
savings from mergers are not substantial. Since labor costs are the largest component of
hospital costs, these results have implications for whether employment contracts are likely
1The ﬁrst author met with executives of Columbia/HCA as part of the April 2000 NBER Conference on
the Industrial Organization of Medical Care.
2A related literature examines the eﬀect of conversions from non-proﬁt (NP) to for-proﬁt (FP) status and
vice-versa. This is not the same question since the majority of hospitals acquired by FP chains are FP and
vice-versa. According to Spetz et al. (1999), only 20% of changes in ownership involved a change in the NP
or FP status of the hospital.
3to be aﬀected.
However, Gaynor and Vogt (2000) argue that the empirical research on scale economies
is plagued with diﬃculties. First, the caseload mix varies across hospitals. Large hospitals
tend to treat more severely ill patients, and thus have higher costs. Moreover, these hospitals
deliver a broader range of services. Thus, scale economies might be realized by consolidating
the services of several hospitals, as a chain could do.
Several studies have suggested that hospital markets are not perfectly competitive and
that mergers can result in higher prices. For example, Keeler et al. (1999), conclude that
mergers can drive up prices by as much as 26 percent. Simpson and Shin (1998) show that
the prices of non-proﬁt hospitals are higher in more concentrated markets. Krishnan (2001)
examines prices within Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) and ﬁnds that prices rise when
merging hospitals gain signiﬁcant DRG-speciﬁc market share. On the other hand, Barro
(2000) found no evidence of increases in market power, and Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000)
argue that heterogeneity in provider services makes it diﬃcult to reach ﬁrm conclusions about
the relationship between market concentration and prices. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to deﬁne
a market, and data on actual prices paid for services are often unavailable.
I n c r e a s e si np r o d u c tm a r k e tp o w e rc o u l db er e ﬂ e c t e di nl o w e rq u a l i t ys e r v i c e sr a t h e r
than higher prices. Hamilton and Ho (2000) ﬁnd that hospital mergers have no eﬀect on
the mortality of heart-attack patients, but that the acquisition of independent hospitals
raises readmission rates. Madison (2001) also examines heart-attack patients, and ﬁnds
that patients treated in a multi-hospital system receive more intensive treatments at lower
expenditure, but that there is no change in mortality. Farsi (2002) reports similar results
for elderly heart-attack patients in California, while Kessler and McClellan (1999) ﬁnd that
the mortality of heart-attack patients is higher in more concentrated markets.
2.3 Eﬀects on Labor Markets
In contrast to the relatively well-developed literature on the eﬀects of mergers on prices
and patient outcomes, there has been little attention to the eﬀects on labor markets, at
least by economists. This is surprising, since the quantity and quality of nursing care is
likely to be highly related to outcomes (Needleman et al., 2002). Moreover, a good deal of
qualitative evidence on the eﬀects of takeovers on workers exists. Corey-Lisle et al. (1999)
and Sochalski and Aiken (1999) note that reductions in the registered nursing (RN) staﬀ
following takeovers require nurses to care for more patients who are sicker on average, and
4also to spend more of their time supervising unlicensed aides rather than engaging directly
in patient care. Moreover, nurses are more likely to be rotated through diﬀerent areas of
the hospital in order to respond to ﬂuctuations in demand, rather than to have “downtime”
when their own unit is less busy. Davidson et al. (1997) ﬁnds that these changes have
increased voluntary turnover among nurses. Clark et al. (2001) report on responses to a
survey of 1,500 nurses. They ﬁnd that nurses who experienced job restructuring related to
mergers had more negative views of the climate for patient care than other nurses.
These staﬃng issues have become major themes in the drive to organize California nurses
and hospital workers. Historically, only workers in public hospitals were unionized.3 How-
ever, in the last few years, the two unions representing nurses and hospital workers, the Ser-
vice Employee’s International Union (SEIU) and the California Nurses Association (CNA),
have made great strides, organizing many hospitals in 2001 and 2002. Moreover, nurses have
been lobbying the California Department of Health Services (DHS) to pass a law mandating
minimum nurse-patient ratios. The DHS issued proposed minimum staﬃng ratios in January
of this year, which may become law.
This brief review of the literature suggests ﬁrst, that the issue of how mergers aﬀect
costs (which are dominated by labor) is unresolved; second, that it is important to control
for heterogeneity between hospitals and health care markets when examining the eﬀects
of mergers; and third, that it will be important to consider "eﬀort" as well as wages and
employment when examining the eﬀect of mergers on hospital labor markets.
2.4 California’s Hospital Market4
As discussed above, six chains own more than a third of hospitals in California. In this paper,
we will examine the impact of joining each of ﬁve large chains: Catholic Healthcare West,
Sutter, Columbia-HCA, Tenet, and OrNda. We deﬁne a large chain, somewhat arbitrarily,
as a chain that owned at least 10 hospitals for 3 or more years in our sample. Many of the
hospitals in our data set merged with one or two other hospitals over our sample period to
form groups of two or three hospitals. We do not treat these as “chains”.
Tenet and Columbia/HCA are the largest for-proﬁt hospital corporations operating in
California, with 40 and 10 general acute care hospitals each in 2002, respectively. Tenet was
3The major exception to this generalization was Kaiser, whose workers were unionized over our sample
period. Kaiser’s 27 hospitals are not included in our main sample, because Kaiser does not report all of the
information on wages and employment.
4Much of the material in this section is drawn from Spetz (1999, 2001).
5formed by the merger of American Medical Holdings and National Medical Enterprises in
1995. In 1997, it absorbed 17 hospitals from the OrNda chain, which itself had been formed
via the merger of American Healthcare Management and Summit Health Ltd. in 1994. We
treat NME hospitals as Tenet in our models. Columbia/HCA has grown via a series of
smaller acquisitions.
The non-proﬁt chains we focus on are Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) and Sutter
Health. Sutter is a secular non-proﬁt hospital group which currently owns 26 acute care
hospitals in northern California. CHW represents the merger of several small groups of
hospitals owned by diﬀerent, mainly Catholic, religious orders. CHW now operates 42 general
acute care hospitals in California, making it the largest non-proﬁt hospital group in the state.
However, as Spetz et al. (1999) argue convincingly, the concept of “ownership” is somewhat
murky for Catholic non-proﬁts. They quote an oﬃcial at CHW who explained that under
cannon law, each hospital is owned by its religious order. Thus, it is not clear a priori how
much direct control is exercised by the larger organization, although it is unlikely that a
hospital could unilaterally choose to leave CHW.
We omit Kaiser Permanente which owns 27 hospitals in California from our data since
Kaiser does not report much of the data we use. We do however take account of their
holdings when constructing measures of hospital ﬁrm’s market share below. Also, while
we include their hospitals in the data, we do not treat Adventist Health as a chain. This
group, which is aﬃliated with the Seventh Day Adventist Church, owns 15 hospitals but did
not experience changes in ownership over our sample period. Kaiser also experienced few
ownership changes.
3D a t a
The data for our study come from California’s Hospital Disclosure Data (CADD) for ﬁs-
cal years 1989/90 to 1998/99. The CADD consists of information from hospital ﬁnancial
reports (disclosure reports) which are submitted annually to the State of California’s Of-
ﬁce of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). All non-federal hospitals are
required to report (although as discussed above, Kaiser does not submit full reports). Hos-
pitals include information about ownership, for-proﬁt or non-proﬁt status, number of beds,
costs and revenues, and personnel.
The reports include the number of productive hours (hours actually worked), non-productive
hours (paid time oﬀ including vacation, sick-leave, and holidays), and hourly wages for
6seven categories of personnel: Registered Nurses (RNs), Licensed Vocational Nurses (LVNs),
aides and orderlies, management and supervisory, technical and specialist, clerical and
other administrative, and workers in food and accommodation services (“environmental”).5
An eighth category includes all other classiﬁcations including salaried physicians and non-
physician medical practitioners. Under California law, only public hospitals can employ
physicians. Hence, the number of physicians who are treated as employees is small. In this
study we focus on nursing staﬀ (RNs, LVNs, and aides), since the other categories of workers
are more heterogeneous, making it diﬃcult to interpret changes in group wages.6
As Spetz et al. (1999, 2001) report, the OSHPD data are quite noisy. Some of the
most important problems include: Non-standard reporting periods, multiple reports in a
single year, and late reporting or failure to report ownership changes. This latter problem is
particularly acute for non-proﬁt chains, probably because of the ambiguity about ownership
noted above. Since the beginning and end dates of each reporting period are included in the
data, it is relatively easy to adjust for the ﬁrst two problems.7 Spetz et al. (1999) includes
a data appendix with corrected ownership data, which we have used to correct the OSHPD
data.8 We also discovered many cases in which psychiatric hospitals or drug rehabilitation
centers (such as the Betty Ford clinic) were incorrectly coded as general purpose acute care
hospitals, and we deleted these from our data set. We do not have systematic data on union
status, though as discussed above, most unionization activity has occurred very recently and
not during the period covered by our data.9
5Nurses working as supervisors or instructors are included in the management/supervision and techni-
cal/specialist categories.
6For example, technical employees include accountants as well as x-ray technicians.
7In our analyses, the unit of observation is a hospital-year. In order to create a single observation for each
hospital-year we ﬁrst arranged the data so that every report was considered in the ﬁscal year (beginning June
30) that covered the largest part of the reporting period. We then combined multiple reports for a single
year to form a single record. For example, we took weighted averages (where the weights were the number
of days in each reporting period) of stock variables such as assets and personnel, and we took weighted sums
of ﬂow variables such as discharges, costs, and revenues. If the hospital’s ownership changed, we used the
report that covered the largest part of the year.
8The appendix covers data through 1996. They do however, report on mergers that took place between
1996 and 1999 in the text, and we veriﬁed ownership of hospitals in recent years using parent organization
web sites and hospital web sites.
9Given that unionization drives are currently being conducted at many hospitals, and are vigorously
resisted by management, the SEIS and CNA are reluctant to share information about their organizing
activities. Thus, we were unable to obtain a complete list of unionized hospitals with dates of unionization.
However, the SEIS negotiated a breakthrough agreement with CHW in 2001, covering 20 hospitals in 15
cities. The CNA also organized 8 large hospitals in 2001, accounting for approximately 2,000 nurses. News
reports indicate that these victories were regarded as important turning points in the battle to unionize
California hospital workers.
7Figure 1a shows the distribution of hospitals across California in 1990, while ﬁgure 1b
shows California’s "health service areas". HSAs are health care markets, as deﬁned by the
state. They reﬂect the fact that hospitals are more densely concentrated in urban areas (so
that urban HSAs cover smaller areas). Figures 2a and 2b show the growth in the chains we
study between 1990 and 1999, and their geographical coverage. The ﬁgures illustrate the
rapid growth of chains, and their concentration in urban markets. The for-proﬁt chains tend
to be slightly more concentrated in urban areas than the non-proﬁt chains. There is also
some division between northern and southern California: for example, Sutter operates only
in the north, while Tenet has moved into the Los Angeles area very aggressively.
Increased concentration has also occurred because of hospital closures. A recent report
commissioned by the California Attorney General examined 17 hospital closures that oc-
curred between 1995 and 2000 (Nicholas C. Petris Center, 2001). Tenet was involved in
at least ﬁve of these closures, including four closures of facilities that it acquired when it
absorbed OrNda. CHW closed one hospital in 1999. The report indicated that the closed
hospitals were generally small (all of the closures considered in the report, including some
that occurred in 2000, accounted for three percent of California’s hospital beds) and in con-
siderable ﬁnancial diﬃculty. Some hospitals closed because they were unable to meet more
stringent seismic requirements, and many more hospitals are expected to close for this reason
in future. Many shuttered hospitals remained medical centers, converting to long-term care
or outpatient facilities. In this paper, we consider employment contracts at all operating
acute-care hospitals. We do however, account for the eﬀect of closures indirectly when we
consider the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s share (of the beds in the local hospital market) on outcomes.
We also account for changes in the number of beds in the market over time by including
HSA*year eﬀects in our regression models, as discussed further below.
Increased concentration in the hospital market is shown in Figure 3, which plots Herﬁnd-
ahl indices for four health service areas. The Herﬁndahls are computed using the number
of acute care beds in each hospital. Figure 3 illustrates that while concentration has in-
creased throughout the state, it has grown much more rapidly in northern than in southern
California. Sacramento was the most concentrated market over much of the period, with
San Francisco catching up in the last two years of the sample. In contrast, the degree of
concentration is much smaller in Los Angeles and San Diego, although it has been rising.
Means of key variables are shown in Table 1 for all hospitals and separately for each
chain. The unit of observation is a hospital year, and a hospital is included in the column for
the chain only in the years when it actually belonged to that chain. The ﬁrst three measures
8in Table 1 show the “output” of the hospital. One can see that there is little systematic
diﬀerence between the chain hospitals and other hospitals in terms of number of beds, the
n u m b e ro fp a t i e n td a y s( p e rd a y ) ,o rg r o s sp a t i e n tr e v e n u e sp e rd a y .G r o s sp a t i e n tr e v e n u e s
are what is actually billed rather than what is collected, and so reﬂect the value of services
rendered. While CHW hospitals are larger than the others with an average of 235 beds,
Sutter and Tenet both have hospitals that are somewhat smaller on average than the overall
mean of 183 beds.
The next four rows show wages for four categories of nursing personnel: registered nurses
(RNs), Licensed Vocational Nurses (LVNs), aides, and contracted nursing personnel in real
2001 dollars. RNs are more highly trained then LVNs, who in turn are more skilled than
aides. Beginning in December 1992, OSHPD also asked hospitals about the employment of
contracted nursing personnel. Unfortunately, data for RNs, LVNs, and aides working under
contract are all grouped together, although the high average wages for this group suggest that
they are relatively skilled workers. These data do not suggest monopsony, since if anything
nurses working for large chains are more highly paid than other nurses. Note that this does
not reﬂect a hospital size eﬀect, since, as we saw above, hospitals are not systematically
larger in large chains. However, it might reﬂect a ﬁrm size eﬀect, something we will control
f o rb e l o w . I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et h a tt h eh i g h e rw a g e si nc h a i n sr e ﬂ e c tt h ec o n c e n t r a t i o no f
chains in large urban areas.
We next show the number of nursing hours employed by the hospital (per day). It is
evident that the average hospital employs more RNs than LVNs or aides. Data on contract
worker hours (which may be zero) are reported for only 63 percent of the hospital-years
in our data, but where it is reported, the number of contract worker hours is very small
relative to RN hours. While less skilled LVN and aide hours may be substituted for RN
hours, the literature suggests that RNs remain ultimately responsible for supervising less
skilled workers. Hence, in our empirical work below we focus on RN hours, and on total
nursing hours measured as the sum of RN, LVN, and aide hours. We also show results for an
alternative measure which includes the contract nursing personnel, although it is available
only from 1993 on, and is generally quite similar to the RN plus LVN plus aide total.
Table 1 also shows several measures of nurse “eﬀort”. These measures attempt to capture
the number of patients a nurse would be responsible for during his or her shift. This focus
on patients per nurse corresponds to the emphasis on staﬃng ratios by nurse organizations.
Since hospitalized patients require 24 hour nursing care, we take patient days (per day),
divide by total productive hours (per day), and multiply by 24. The ﬁrst measure, “RN
9eﬀort” is the number of patients each registered nurse attends. The average is 4.36 in non-
chain hospitals, compared to 3.69 at CHW and 3.37 at Tenet.
However, when we consider all available nursing hours, or “total eﬀort”, hospitals appear
to be much more similar. For example, the non-chain hospitals have a mean of 2.23 patients
per nursing staﬀ member compared to 2.31 and 2.28 for CHW and Tenet respectively. Thus,
more of the care is provided by RNs in chain hospitals. Again, these diﬀerences could reﬂect
either the types of services oﬀered by the hospitals (e.g. hospitals treating sicker patients
would require more skilled staﬀ), or diﬀerences in the markets served by chain and non-chain
hospitals. It will be important to control for these diﬀerences below.
Finally, Table 1 indicates the average ﬁrm share of each hospital. On average, hospitals
belong to ﬁrms which have only 3 percent of the local acute care hospital beds. But in the
largest chains, hospitals belong to ﬁrms which have closer to 10 percent of the available beds
on average. The hospital whose ﬁrm has the largest share is San Francisco General Hospital
Medical Center, which has 33 percent of it’s HSA’s beds, and does not belong to a chain.
Among the chains, the maximum ﬁrm share enjoyed in any market is 28 percent for CHW
in the Santa Barbara area; 26 percent for Sutter in the Sacramento area; and 21 percent for
Tenet in Orange County.
4T h e M o d e l
The question we wish to address is how revenue, wages, employment, and eﬀort change when
a hospital is taken over. There are two sources of change that are considered here. The ﬁrst
is that the acquiring ﬁrm increases the hospital’s revenue stream. Marginal revenue may
go up with a takeover because the ﬁrm is better able to negotiate with HMOs or otherwise
able to charge higher prices for its services, because the ﬁrm is more eﬀective in generating
revenues from government (as in Cutler and Horowitz), or because it improves the collection
of outstanding bills. Secondly, a take over could result in a reorganization of production. In
this section, the implications of these two sources of change are considered in the context of
three simple models of employment: perfect competition, monopsony and contracting.
The standard monopsony model is based on the idea that a large local employer can aﬀect
wages via its demand for labor. This implies that demand is reduced below the competitive
level, to reduce wages. However, the standard monopsony model supposes that wages depend
only upon the supply and demand for nurses. In practice, a job at a particular hospital is
likely to have features that make it more or less desirable than other similar positions, and
10hence as Rosen (1975) has argued, market wages should reﬂect not only current labor market
conditions, but also the nature of working conditions. Although it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence
of such compensating wage diﬀerentials in practice, the theory is very clear and some evidence
does exist. For example, Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) have shown that the probability of
a layoﬀ can aﬀect the wage premium oﬀered by a ﬁrm. In this paper, we focus upon the
consequence of incorporating “work intensity” or “eﬀort” on the compensating diﬀerential
oﬀered by the ﬁrm.
Let  denote the eﬀort per hour of a nurse. The total output from  hours of nursing
services is  The utility per hour of a nurse is assumed to be decreasing in the level of
eﬀort, and given by:
 ()= −  () (1)
where  is the hourly wage, and  () is the disutility of eﬀort. The function  satisﬁes
 (0) = 0     0with lim→¯   ()=∞where ¯  is the maximum eﬀort possible in the
market. We cannot observe individual nurses, and hence it is assumed that they all have
the same preferences within a single category of employee. Let 0 be the customary level of
e ﬀ o r ti nt h em a r k e t ,a n d0 the corresponding market wage.
Let 	
() be the revenue function for a hospital where 	 is a revenue shifter, 
is total nurse services, and  is capital. In the short run capital is assumed to be ﬁxed, and
hence the question is how a takeover aﬀects wages, eﬀort, and hours?
4.1 The Competitive Model
First suppose that the labor market remains competitive after a takeover, in which case the
only way for the takeover to have an eﬀect is through the revenue shifter, 	 The problem
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It is assumed that the revenue function is strictly concave and increasing in its arguments.
The owner can increase eﬀort  above the market norm 0 b yp a y i n gac o m p e n s a t i n gd i ﬀ e r -
ential ()= () −  (0)and hence the nurse’s wage is  = 0 + 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Notice that substituting the ﬁrst order condition (4) into condition (3) results in the
condition:

  () − ()=
0 (5)
This implies that the level of eﬀort is independent of the revenue shifter. The ﬁrst order
condition (4), combined with the concavity of the revenue function implies that  is in-
creasing with 	 which combined with the previous result implies that hours demanded, 
is increasing with 	 These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the hospital’s marginal revenue increases in a competitive labor market,
then demand for labor () and revenue increases. If the ﬁrm cannot aﬀect the market wage,
then eﬀort and wages paid remain unchanged when the ﬁrm’s marginal productivity increases.
This result implies that when a ﬁrm takes over a hospital, a reorganization of the hospital
leading to an increase in marginal productivity should not result in an increase in the eﬀort
exerted by nurses, nor in an increase in wages if the hospital is suﬃciently small that it
cannot eﬀect the local market wage for nurses.
4.2 Monopsony
Now consider the case in which the ﬁrm’s hiring decisions can aﬀect the local labor market.
Market power is modelled by supposing that the local wage, 0 () is an increasing function
of total hours demanded in the local market. Suppose a single hospital employs  hours
and it is a member of a ﬁrm which employs 0 hours at its other hospitals, while the
other ﬁrms employ a total of hours. In that case the total hours in the labor market are
 =  + 0 + 
The hospital chooses its hours taking into account the eﬀect that its employment decisions
have upon the wage costs of the chain owning the ﬁrm. Let  = 
00 () be the
12wage elasticity of labor supply, and  = +0
 be the share of the market owned by the











 − () − 
0 ()(1+) (6)
This can be written in the more familar form:
Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost + 
0 ()
which implies that the monoponistic ﬁrm restricts hours relative to the competitive case.








  ()=0  (7)
From the concavity of the revenue function it follows that ∗	  0 and ∗  0.
Substituting this ﬁrst order condition into the condition for hours one has:
 (
∗ (	)) = 
0 ()(1+) (8)
where  ()=  ()−() is an increasing function of From this expression one can
determine the hours choosen as a function of the concentration in the market. In particular,
it implies that   0 and therefore ∗  0This increase in eﬀort implies via
equation (7) that revenue decreases at the hospital when concentration increases.






Since ∗ (	) is decreasing in ad e c r e a s ei n results in an increase in the compensating
diﬀerential (∗ (	)) and a decrease in the market wage 0 () hence the eﬀect on
wages paid to employees is ambiguous. This is illustrated in Figure 4. Notice that the
change in the wages paid to the employee,  −  is smaller than the change that would
occur in the standard monopsony model without eﬀort, which would be given by  − 	
Equation (8) can also be used to determine the eﬀect of a change in the revenue shifter.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to 	 one sees that 	  0 and ∗ ( (	)	)	  0and
therefore wages, as well as revenues, rise. These eﬀects are summarized in the following
proposition.
13Proposition 2 In a monopsonistic market, an increase in a ﬁrm’s market share results in
increased eﬀort, and a decrease in hours and revenue. The eﬀect on wages paid is indetermi-
nate. Keeping market share ﬁxed, an increase in the ability to generate revenue (	)r e s u l t s
in more eﬀort, more hours, more revenue and a higher wage.
Thus in the case of monopsony, the addition of eﬀort modiﬁes the standard results in
two signiﬁcant ways. First it implies that the eﬀect of market power on wages paid is
ambiguous because an increase in market power results in lower demand for labor (which
depresses wages) and higher eﬀort (which increases wages). The model would be rejected if
we observed a decrease in eﬀort and an increase in wages. Secondly, the ﬁrst order condition
for eﬀort implies that the revenue shifter 	 eﬀects wages and hours through its eﬀects on
eﬀort. In other words, when 	 goes up, then eﬀort should rise, as should revenue and hours.
4.3 Contracts
The monopsony model supposes that ﬁrms exercise market power through their labor de-
mand decisions. However, beginning with Simon (1951), there is a large literature that views
the employment relationship as the outcome of a contract between the employee and the em-
ployer. Beginning with Williamson, Whacter and Harris (1975), the literature highlights the
fact that even if the labor market is competitive, a contract is needed to protect relationship
speciﬁc rents that arise after an employee has accepted a position.
Firms may invest in training the worker for hospital speciﬁc tasks. Among workers,
examples of relationship speciﬁc investments include ﬁnding accommodation that is closer
to ones place of work, learning about job speciﬁc characteristics or routines, and learning to
cooperate with co-workers. Grout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1998) have shown that in
the absence of a contract, both the ﬁrm and employee will underinvest, a problem that can
be solved by having a wage that is ﬁxed in advance. Macleod and Malcomson (1993) have
shown more generally, that under the appropriate conditions the optimal contract entails a
ﬁxed wage that is periodically renegotiated to reﬂect market conditions. Ashenfelter and
Brown (1986) use data on a sample of unionized workers to study the properties of these
t y p e so fe m p l o y m e n tc o n t r a c t s .
A diﬃculty with using contract theory to study the market for nurses in California is
that they are employed “at-will”, and therefore when a merger occurs there is no legal
obligation for the new owner to respect any previous wage agreements. Moreover, given that
it is costly for incumbent workers to leave and ﬁnd alternative employment, the new ﬁrm
14can unilaterally decrease wages to the point that current employees are indiﬀerent between
staying and leaving. In this case the allocation would be the same as for the competitive
labor market described above, and the takeover would not entail any change in eﬀort.
However, given that it is eﬃcient for the ﬁrm to enter into long term employment con-
tracts, then ﬁrms must also be able to enter into implicit agreements that employees feel
they can rely on. Wages and eﬀort demanded are quite diﬀerent in this regard. The wage
is a ﬁxed amount that is paid regularly, and the amount is easily veriﬁable. Thus, if the
new owner were to unilaterally lower wages, then this would signal to employees that they
should not make any relationship speciﬁc investments, and the resulting outcome would be
ineﬃcient.10
But this reasoning is unlikely to apply to “eﬀort”. As Simon (1951) emphasizes, an
important feature of the employment relationship is the right of the employer to exert “au-
thority” over an employee. In the hospital context the amount of work that an employee
is expected to perform depends on the current demand for services. This demand can vary
hourly in the face of unexpected events such as car accidents, patients with complications,
and so on.
Hence, when an employee is hired, eﬀort would typically not be explicitly speciﬁed.
Rather the individual would be given a description of the job from which expected eﬀort could
be inferred. This arrangement implies that as long as the employee’s utility remains greater
than in her next best alternative employment, the ﬁrm can vary demand for eﬀort without it
being immediately obvious that they are violating their implicit agreement, especially since,
in the context of a takeover, it is reasonable for the ﬁrm to engage in a reorganization of
work.
These arguments suggest that in the event of a takeover the ﬁrm may be reluctant to lower
wages, but will feel free to adjust eﬀort, subject to a market constraint. If the new owner
reduces employment, then incumbent workers faces the possibility of losing their relationship
speciﬁc rent, which is denoted by   0 In other words the employee will not choose to
leave as long as her utility loss from the merger is less than  Thus the optimization
10In particular, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) for a discussion on how norms of fairness may arise
as an equilibrium phenomena in markets to solve this commitment problem.












+  ≥ 
0
If the ﬁrm were to increase employment, then  would be zero, and hence there is
an asymmetry between increases and decreases in employment. Given a binding individual
rationality constraint, the eﬀort level that solves this problem is the solution to:
(()) = 
0 +  − 
0 (10)





If the revenue function is concave then  is decreasing in  and increasing in 	
This model has the following predictions. In the event of a takeover, eﬀort increases,
hours decrease, and wages are unchanged. There will also be an increase in revenue. If there
are no relationship speciﬁc rents, then the contract model implies that an increase in 	 will
result in more hours and higher revenues. With wages ﬁxed, eﬀort will also remain constant.
These observations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 If ﬁrms respect outstanding wage agreements and enforce pay equity among
workers, then a takeover leads to fewer hours, more eﬀort, and higher revenues. If the
takeover is motivated solely by the opportunity to shift the revenue function outwards (i.e.
an increase in 	), then hours and revenues increase, and there is no eﬀect on wages or eﬀort.
4.4 Summary
In summary, if 	 is held constant, then the three models outlined above have the following
predictions:
16Perfect Competition Monopsony Contract
Revenue 0 - +
Wages 0 ? 0
Hours 0 - -
Eﬀort 0 + +
Chart 1: Eﬀect of an Increase in Firm’s Market Share
If a merger is motivated only by the new management’s ability to increase marginal
revenues (	) then the three models have the following predictions.
Perfect Competition Monopsony Contract
Revenue + + +
Wages 0 + 0
Hours + + +
Eﬀort + + 0
Chart 2: Eﬀect of the Revenue Shifter, 	
4.5 Empirical Model
We estimate regression models using measures of output, revenue, wages, hours, and eﬀort
as the dependent variables. The ﬁrst set of models examine the eﬀects of belonging to a
chain, where eﬀects are allowed to diﬀer between chains. They take the form:









 + 6 ∗  
 
 +  
 (12)
where OUTCOME is one of the dependent variables discussed above, and CHW etc. are
dummy variables equal to one if the hospital belongs to one of the speciﬁed chains. A vector
of hospital-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, , are included in order to control for factors such as the size
of the hospital and the casemix at the beginning of the sample period. Finally, a complete
set of HSA and year interactions control for market conditions in each HSA and year. These
eﬀects control for many omitted variables such as the behavior of local HMOs which might
otherwise threaten the validity of our research design.
In models of the form (12), the estimated eﬀects of joining one chain may be diﬀerent from
joining another either because there is variation in the size and market power of the chains,
17or because diﬀerent chains adopt diﬀerent production technologies. Moreover, although we
include hospital ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression, the chain’s share of capacity in the HSA can
change even in the absence of a takeover. For example, the other hospitals in a chain will
experience a change in ﬁrm share when the target ﬁrm joins. In order to try to diﬀerentiate
between these eﬀects, we also estimate a set of models that augment (12) by adding an
explicit control for the ﬁrm’s share of the local market, as measured by the fraction of HSA
hospital beds that the ﬁrm controls.
The monopsony model predicts that an increase in ﬁrm share should reduce employment
and increase eﬀort, whether or not it is associated with a takeover (holding demand for ser-
vices constant). The other models do not indicate any explicit role for ﬁrm share. However,
in a contracting model ﬁrm share could reﬂect two oﬀsetting eﬀects. First, ﬁrms with larger
market shares may have more ability to increase revenues per unit of output in the target
ﬁrm (i.e. 	), which would lead to a positive correlation between ﬁrm share and hours in the
absence of a direct measure of 	. Second, the amount of relationship speciﬁc capital 
could be increasing in ﬁrm share, in which case one might ﬁnd a positive correlation between
ﬁrm share, eﬀort, and output, and a negative correlation between ﬁrm share and hours.
The eﬀects of ﬁrm share are further explored by constraining variation in the eﬀects of
joining a chain to work primarily through diﬀerences in ﬁrm share. These models have the
form:

 = ! + !1 











where ANYCHAIN indicates that the hospital belongs to one of the ﬁve large chains,
FSHARE is the share of the ﬁrm’s beds in the local HSA, and NOCHAIN indicates that the
ﬁrm does not belong to one of the ﬁve chains. In these regressions, we expect that !2 will be
positive if the eﬀect of joining chains is larger when the chains have greater market share,
while !3 captures the eﬀect of ﬁrm share in the other hospitals.
5R e s u l t s
Estimates of model (12) are shown in Table 2. The ﬁrst section of the table deals with our
measures of output, and indicates that takeovers by the ﬁve chains appear to have little
consistent eﬀect on the number of beds and generally positive eﬀects on the number of
18patient days in the target hospital, though these are generally only signiﬁcant at the ten
percent level. Gross patient revenues increase, which may indicate either higher prices, or an
increased intensity of services provided to patients (as would be the case with sicker patients,
for example). Hence, it appears that output increases rather than decreases in the target
hospital following takeover by a chain. This result is consistent either with a contracting
model or with takeovers that are motivated by the opportunity to increase the marginal
eﬃciency of revenue generation. But it is not consistent with a takeover whose primary goal
is to increase the ﬁrm’s power in the labor market.
Eﬀects on wages are small and not consistently statistically signiﬁcant. Takeovers by
CHW are accompanied by reductions in the wages of RNs and aides of approximately 3
percent, though there are no changes in the wages of LVNs. At Columbia-HCA hospitals,
there are slightly larger declines in wages of LVNs and aides, but no change in the wages of
RNs. At Sutter, there are no changes in wages, and at Tenet, only the wages of contract
workers fall. However, since we do not know the composition of contract workers, it is
diﬃcult to determine if this represents a shift towards less-skilled contract workers, or a true
decline in wages. These ﬁndings are consistent with the previous literature on monopsony
in the market for nurses, in that they do not provide evidence in support of the wage eﬀects
predicted by the traditional monopsony model.
The third section of Table 2 shows the eﬀects of takeovers on hours. Here again, the eﬀects
are somewhat inconsistent. Only Tenet shows large and signiﬁcant decreases in hours. CHW
and Columbia-HCA also show some declines, though they are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Sutter is strikingly diﬀerent, in that it shows a nine percent increase in total nursing hours.
However, Sutter also showed the largest increases in output, suggesting that takeovers by
Sutter may increase hospital revenues per unit of output (	)
The last section of Table 2 focuses on “eﬀort”, that is nurse hours normalized by patient
days. These ﬁndings are much clearer. There is an increase in the eﬀort required of both
RNs and of the total nursing staﬀ in the two largest chains, CHW and Tenet, as well as an
increase in eﬀort by the total nursing staﬀ in OrNda. All but one of the estimated coeﬃcients
are positive, though those for the other chains are not statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect on
eﬀort is consistent with both our monopsony and contract models.
Table 3 provides estimates of a version of (12) which also includes the ﬁrm’s share of
capacity (i.e. beds) in the HSA. The ﬁrst part of Table 3 suggests that the increase in
ﬁrm share that accompanies takeovers is responsible for at least some of the increase in
output at target ﬁrms since the coeﬃcients on the “chain dummies” (a1 to a5)f a l lo rb e c o m e
19statistically insigniﬁcant when ﬁrm share is controlled. Firm share has little eﬀect on wages,
except among contract workers, a result which is diﬃcult to interpret given that we do not
know the composition of the contract workers. Once again then, the estimates provide little
support for the standard prediction that increased market power will be accompanied with
decreases in wages.
Given the eﬀects of ﬁrm share on output, it is perhaps unsurprising that ﬁrm share also
has positive eﬀects on total nursing hours. However, the increases in hours are smaller than
the increases in patient days, so that increases in ﬁrm share increase nurse eﬀort. Again, the
eﬀects of joining a chain are somewhat reduced, though still signiﬁcant, when ﬁrm share is
controlled, indicating that some of the eﬀect of joining a chain operates through increases in
market power as measured by ﬁrm share.
Table 4 shows estimates of (13). The results shown in Table 4 are consistent with the
earlier tables in that they suggest that joining a chain is associated with increased output,
as measured by patient days, as well as with increased nurse eﬀort. There is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on wages or on hours. In contrast, ﬁrm share in non-chain hospitals has a positive
eﬀect on all four outcomes. It is particularly remarkable that RN wages rise with ﬁrm share,
which is inconsistent with the simplest monopsony model. Firm share in chain hospitals
has a positive eﬀect on patient days and RN eﬀort, but only the latter eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level of conﬁdence.
In summary, our empirical results are consistent with the previous literature, which
found scant evidence of monopsony in the market for nurses, when focusing on wage and
employment outcomes. There is little consistent evidence that increases in market power
associated with joining chains reduce either wages or employment. On the other hand, they
do increase the amount of eﬀort required from the nursing staﬀ, as measured by the number
of patients each nurse and/or aide must attend to. This result is consistent with a broader
view of the employment contract, in which the ﬁrm sets wages, employment, and also the
minimum eﬀort required of employees. It is also noteworthy that takeovers by diﬀerent
c h a i n sa p p e a rt oh a v eq u i t ed i ﬀ e r e n te ﬀ e c t s .T h i sr e s u l ts u g g e s t st h a ti ti si nf a c tt h ea c t i o n s
of the chains after the takeover which aﬀect outcomes, rather than a matter of the chains
being more likely to step in at a particular point in a deterministically unfolding sequence
of events.
206 Discussion and Conclusions
While in principle the introduction of eﬀort into a monopsony model can explainwhy previous
studies have not found much evidence of monopsony power on wages in this market, the case
in favor of the monopsony model is still far from clear cut. Two aspects of the evidence
suggest that monopsony cannot be the whole story. The ﬁrst is that a monopsony achieves
its gains by restricting output, and hence takeovers that are motivated only by monopsony
should result in lower revenues (though higher proﬁts). Secondly, the monopsony model
predicts that an increase in ﬁrm share results in lower, not higher hours.
One cannot exclude the possibility that takeovers both increase monopsony power, and
also increase the target hospital’s revenue per unit of output by shifting 	 The results for
Sutter suggest that such increases in revenue are important since it is otherwise diﬃcult
to explain the increases in hours and revenue which accompany takeovers by this chain.
However, the fact that eﬀort does not increase at Sutter is inconsistent with the monopsony
model, which predicts increases in eﬀort with or without shifts in the hospital’s revenue
function.
We have not dwelt on the lengthy literature on the potential diﬀerences between non-
proﬁt and for-proﬁt ﬁrms. Following Arrow (1963), theoretical models of the non-proﬁt ﬁrm
have often assumed that providers choose the non-proﬁt form in order to signal their high
commitment to quality care (c.f. Frank and Salkever (1994); Glaeser and Schleifer (1998)).
However, the empirical literature has been hard pressed to demonstrate consistent diﬀerences
in quality between non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt ﬁrms (Sloan (2000); Sloan (2002); and Baker et al.
(2000) provide extensive summaries of this literature). For example, Sloan (2002) concludes
that conversions in status have little eﬀect on in-hospital mortality or charity care, although
pneumonia patients in hospitals that converted to FP status experienced an increased rate of
complications. Farsi (2002) uses models which account for heterogeneity between hospitals
and ﬁnds that conversions to FP are associated with reductions in in-patient and subsequent
mortality. However, conversion also increases rates of complications among heart-attack
patients, and reduces the probability of being admitted from the emergency room. Thus, it
is diﬃcult to conclude that overall quality is higher or lower.
Our work adds to this literature by demonstrating that the two largest California hospital
chains have much in common with each other, despite the fact that one is for-proﬁt and the
other is non-proﬁt. Moreover, CHW and Tenet are arguably more similar to each other than
CHW is to Sutter (the other large non-proﬁt chain), or Tenet is to Columbia-HCA (the other
21large for-proﬁt chain). Thus our work supports the idea that "ownership diﬀerences turn
out to be much less important than they might seem ... nominal ownership structure seems
to matter much less than fundamental economic incentives" (Pauly, 1987 page 262).
Although labor economists have found little evidence of monopsony in the market for
nurses, nurses have strongly opposed takeovers of hospitals by large multi-hospital chains.
Nurses consistently cite concerns over staﬃng as one of the key reasons that they dislike the
chains. For example, in a discussion of the recent takeover of Queen of Angels-Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical Center by Tenet, the California Nurses’ Association web site describes
concerns that “the hospital’s quality of care will decline under Tenet, especially if there are
any cuts in the nurse-to-bed ratio” (www.calnurse.org/cal/oct/columbia.htm). By extend-
ing the standard monopsony and contract models to incorporate worker eﬀort, the models
presented in this paper provide a possible solution to this puzzle. We ﬁnd that although
there is little decline in wages, nurses are consistently asked to work harder after hospitals
join chains.
If reductions in nurse-patient ratios do lead to lower quality care, then our results may
have broader implications for hospital markets. To the extent that patients can observe
quality and choose from hospitals oﬀering a range of quality levels, reductions in quality
will be reﬂected in the price of hospital services. However, in an increasingly concentrated
market fraught with asymmetric information problems, there can be no presumption that
such reductions in quality are eﬃcient.
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26Table 1: Variable Means for Non-Chain and Chain Hospitals
Non-Chain CHW Sutter Columbia Tenet OrNda # Obs.
# beds 183 235 174 189 178 182 3978
[2.67] [8.79] [14.1] [16.1] [5.49] [13.75]
Patient day 107 144 109 79 89 72 3978
[1.91] [5.78] [10.36] [6.62] [3.38] [6.00]
Gross Pati 353 546 491 391 471 285 3971
(100,000s) [8.14] [.278] [.526] [.353] [.260] [.218]
Wages
  RN  19.60 21.80 23.28 23.88 21.44 21.85 3978
    [.082] [.314] [.513] [.493] [.252] [.295]
  LVN  12.10 13.77 13.86 14.96 13.51 13.82 3914
    [.066] [.182] [.294] [.272] [.162] [.306]
  Aide  8.30 9.25 9.99 10.44 9.01 8.77 3934
    [.036] [.135] [.235] [.228] [.126] [.169]
  Contract n 32.26 33.02 33.50 31.00 29.53 30.50 1594
[.228] [.694] [.751] [.925] [1.30] [1.56]
Hours
  RN  878 1084 966 740 720 579 3978
    [17.2] [47.91] [91.07] [69.05] [31.69] [51.19]
  LVN  129 178 147 95 92 87 3914
    [2.28] [10.6] [14.5] [9.19] [4.42] [9.01]
  Aide  268 291 248 204 176 99 3934
    [17.23] [15.90] [29.38] [23.96] [8.13] [8.31]
  Contract n 28.8 33.5 33.7 39.9 24.3 29.3 2505
    [2.98] [3.66] [9.47] [7.09] [3.15] [6.33]
Effort
  RN  4.36 3.69 2.73 2.69 3.37 3.10 3978
    [.134] [.200] [.114] [.068] [.117] [.118]
  RN+LVN+ 2.23 2.31 1.89 1.88 2.28 2.26 3978
    [.023] [.051] [.051] [.048] [.043] [.055]
  RN+LVN+ 2.08 2.22 1.81 1.81 2.15 2.20 2505
    [.022] [.059] [.053] [.047] [.040] [.053]
Firm Share 0.034 0.090 0.099 0.044 0.075 0.029 3978
    [.001] [.005] [.009] [.006] [.003] [.002]
H S A Herf 0.083 0.122 0.133 0.104 0.074 0.061 3978
    [.001] [.004] [.004] [.007] [.002] [.005]
# Observat 3298 187 117 63 254 59
Note: Standard errors in brackets.Table 2: Effects of Hospital Takeovers by Large Chains
CHW Sutter Columbia Tenet OrNda #obs. #hospitals R-sq
-0.013 0.032 -0.059 0.030 0.035 3978 446 0.067
(0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026)
0.056 0.093 -0.007 0.012 0.126 3977 446 0.062
(0.034) (0.052) (90.048) (0.038) (0.047)
0.056 0.141 -0.045 0.093 0.157 3970 446 0.644
(0.027) (0.040) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037)
-0.029 0.015 -0.010 0.000 0.024 3978 446 0.586
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
-0.008 0.040 -0.040 0.003 0.034 3914 440 0.445
(0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
-0.025 -0.007 -0.035 -0.007 0.003 3934 443 0.399
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
0.032 0.117 0.017 -0.149 0.174 1593 354 0.119
0.046 0.070 0.065 0.050 0.065
-0.046 0.112 -0.056 -0.079 0.084 3978 446 0.105
(0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038)
-0.039 0.088 -0.011 -0.114 0.044 3978 446 0.1067
(0.026) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035)
-0.032 0.092 -0.051 -0.151 -0.038 2506 424 0.0965
(0.029) (0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.044)
0.101 -0.021 0.048 0.091 0.042 3977 446 0.0988
(0.036) (0.054) (0.050) (0.039) (0.049)
0.093 0.003 0.003 0.126 0.081 3977 446 0.1304
(0.029) (0.043) (0.040) (0.032) (0.040)
0.079 0.005 0.076 0.083 0.067 2505 424 0.0943
(0.032) (0.047) (0.048) (0.038) (0.050)
Notes: Each row represents output from a separate regression.  All regressions include H S H S A*year
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RNTable 3: Effects of Takeovers by Large Hospital Chains and Firm Share
CHW Sutter Columbia Tenet OrNda fshare #obs. #hospitals R-sq
-0.018 0.027 -0.060 0.012 0.032 0.280 3977 446 0.0685
(0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.121)
0.038 0.076 -0.010 -0.052 0.117 0.995 3977 446 0.0671
(0.035) (0.052) (0.048) (0.040) (0.047) (0.224)
0.037 0.123 -0.048 0.026 0.148 1.040 3970 446 0.6476
(0.027) (0.040) (0.037) (0.032) (0.037) (0.175)
-0.031 0.013 -0.010 -0.007 0.023 0.120 3977 446 0.5861
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.074)
-0.009 0.040 -0.040 0.000 0.033 0.052 3913 440 0.4449
(0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.090)
-0.025 -0.007 -0.035 -0.008 0.003 0.013 3933 443 0.3992
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.078)
0.043 0.119 0.026 -0.085 0.182 -0.965 1593 354 0.126
(0.046) (0.069) (0.064) (0.054) (0.065) (0.313)
-0.049 0.110 -0.056 -0.094 0.082 0.233 3977 446 0.1054
(0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.033) (0.038) (0.181)
-0.049 0.080 -0.012 -0.154 0.039 0.616 3977 446 0.1098
(0.026) (0.038) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.166)
-0.045 0.092 -0.055 -0.195 -0.042 0.699 2505 424 0.1019
(0.029) (0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.044) (0.199)
0.087 -0.034 0.046 0.042 0.035 0.763 3977 446 0.1016
(0.036) (0.054) (0.050) (0.042) (0.049) (0.233)
0.087 -0.004 0.002 0.102 0.078 0.379 3977 446 0.1315
(0.029) (0.043) (0.040) (0.034) (0.040) (0.187)
0.079 0.005 0.076 0.083 0.067 0.003 2505 424 0.0943
(0.033) (0.047) (0.048) (0.041) (0.050) (0.223)
Notes: Each row represents output from a separate regression.  All regressions include H S *year










































































Number of bedsTable 4: Variation in Effects of Mergers with Firm Size
Chain* No Chain*
Chain Firm Size Firm Size #obs. #hospitals R-sq
-0.004 0.293 0.331 3978 446 0.066
(0.015) (0.140) (0.169)
0.084 0.362 1.570 3977 446 0.067
(0.027) (0.257) (0.311)
0.064 0.853 1.190 3970 446 0.646
(0.021) (0.201) (0.244)
0.008 -0.030 0.326 3978 446 0.586
(0.009) (0.084) (0.102)
0.007 -0.008 0.133 3914 440 0.443
(0.011) (0.103) (0.125)
-0.021 0.060 -0.036 3934 443 0.399
(0.010) (0.090) (0.109)
0.077 -1.690 -0.999 1593 354 0.109
(0.037) (0.319) (0.463)
0.009 -0.153 0.418 3978 446 0.099
(0.022) (0.208) (0.253)
0.004 0.074 0.845 3978 446 0.103
(0.020) (0.192) (0.234)
-0.024 0.194 0.715 2506 424 0.087
(0.024) (0.207) (0.298)
0.075 0.515 1.150 3977 446 0.101
(0.028) (0.267) (0.324)
0.080 0.289 0.722 3977 446 0.13
(0.023) (0.215) (0.026)
0.066 0.050 0.077 2505 424 0.093
(0.027) (0.231) (0.333)
Notes: Each row represents output from a separate regression.  AlH S A*year
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in an Monopolistic Market
with Endogenous Effort